26 September 2008
Turkish newspaper Today's Zaman website
[Column by Yavuz Baydar: "Turkey Should Support EU Integration of S. Caucasus"]

"Following the Oct. 15 elections in Azerbaijan, a conclusion satisfactory to Azerbaijanis will be reached in the Nagornyy Karabakh issue by the end of 2008, in November or December, to be precise.

Diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia will be formed, concurrently, and the sides will announce the opening of borders..."

This is the "conclusion based on hunches and signs" that Cengiz Candar, now in New York with President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, came to. We do not have any official confirmation nor any background for this sort of progress, but it is obvious that the tripartite meeting, due to be held to day in New York between the Turkish, Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, labelled justly as "historic," could very well lead to a further opening, even for a road map. Therefore, optimistically but cautiously, one has to wait for a possible "understanding" on whether and how to deal with Nagornyy Karabakh and the occupied Azerbaijani territories. It will be the key for incentives on establishing diplomatic ties and any opening of the border.

As Markar Esayan summarizes perfectly in yesterday's issue of Taraf, beyond the label "historic" lies an unprecedented convergence of the national interests of the three countries. The spark is, beyond doubt, the conflict in Georgia. A new phase is in the making. A de facto partition of Georgia into three has shattered the belief that the single and optimistic focus on the energy game in one country of the Caucasus would remain "unaddressed" by Russia. Issues such as a lasting influence in the region coupled with dependence on Russian gas and security of energy lines have gained urgency both for the US and the EU.

In this context, two important points have to be made. Although little attention has been paid to Turkey's so-called initiative on a Security and Cooperation Platform (simply because it will give Russia the upper hand and sideline the US), the focus should be on the Turco-Armenian-Azerbaijani moves outside the framework of the platform. The second point is that any effort to counterbalance the increasing Russian influence there must be a combined one between the US and the EU - the latter needs to be bolder and more visionary in using its "soft power" to inject a more realistic element than the one involving NATO.

But, although there is reason to be hopeful about the New York talks today, one must not forget that Turkey cannot - and should not - go it alone. The experience of commendable Turkish foreign policy efforts in the region around Turkey showed that these policies must be in sync and cognizant of EU policies since Turkey has to show to the EU once and for all what sort of key player it is to remain in terms of interest in the EU.

Russia, already very powerfully in terms of control of key sectors in Armenia, is being proactive, fully aware of the European moves to "persuade" Baku with "the carrot" that it will very actively resolve the Nagornyy Karabakh issue as long as Baku does not "exclude" Moscow from its energy projects. One should also note that the recent "countermove" by the US and the EU, proposing to Turkey that Armenia be added to the Nabucco project, is a timely one.

But, as Esayan argues, we are just watching the opening episode of a long series of developments, as both Turkey and Armenia seem to agree on a radical change to their patterns vis-a-vis each other. But, the more "visible" the EU (despite its deep internal confusion these days) is in the region, the faster the progress may be.

While in Barcelona, Southeastern Europe, Turkey or beyond, I found myself in an interesting discussion. As several Swedish diplomats and I agreed, there was a serious vacuum in strategic talks between Turkey and the EU about the Caucasus. Francisco Veiga, a respected scholar and a former advisor to the Spanish Foreign Ministry, suggested that Turkey should as soon as possible issues a statement, endorsing the prospective EU membership candidacies of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

This is a very interesting proposal, though it may look far-fetched, regarding the remote perspectives of these countries. But, remembering clearly the reasserted staunch support by Eduard Nalbandyan on Turkey's EU membership, which he expressed to me and Candar in Yerevan recently, such a statement from Ankara might be very useful: It would reaffirm to the EU how committed Turkey would be to its bilateral relations on various discussions with Armenia; it would push EU circles that abused the Turco-Armenian impasse against EU interests in the region; it would underline the inevitability of enhancing EU influence in the Caspian Sea without Turkey's membership.

Let us keep in mind that, in a move reflecting a grain of strategic vision, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU commissioner for external relations, last February gave clear signals of a "brand new period" for the integration of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the EU. This should be pursued and endorsed by Turkish support. Rather than the adventurous path through NATO, Turkey and the EU can achieve results that can be based on mutual interests and not confrontation.